But that doesn't solve the problem he was talking about, which is guaranteeing that content is being delivered to the rightful owner. You can of course encrypt the stream for each individual recipient. But, the overhead would be stupidly high. And, all that a thief needs to do is to get a key for himself (or steal someone else's) and then sell it, or post it. So you still need to be able to have some reasonable assurance the person on the other end actually paid for the content. Suddenly your legitimate access gets cut off because people all over the world start connecting using your encryption key.

One way you could do it is the reverse of what happens when you connect to a server using HTTPS. It involves verification of the identity of the machine based on public key certificates. But, that requires that every machine publically visible have not just an assigned IPV6 address but also an assigned DNS name (and dynamic DNS names probably wouldn't be accepted since they would also be subject to easy abuse.) In that sort of scheme, you'd have to get a certificate for your machine's DNS name, and register it with a well known certificate authority. Then they could be sure they were connecting to you (sans some unlikely situation such as a massive DNS infrastructure hack of course.)

Unfortunately that would be unlikely to be feasible, given that it's probably the only real means by which this could be done. For home machines it wouldn't be so much of an issue, but for all of those portable devices it would be rough.

And of course even then there's nothing to stop me from setting up a server with a certificate, and just re-broadcasting the content again. But at least in that case the person doing it has to take some risk by being publicly accessible.