On June 13, 2010 at 16:22, crosen said...
BTW, the idea that the content is sent on the TMDS stream free and clear of encryption just because the sink was pre-authenticated would not really make for a robust content protection system. This would allow for a "man in the middle" attack. I wouldn't think the industry would have gone for such a solution.
In other words, my understanding of the DCP paper makes sense to me intuitively. This is another reason I feel compelled to clarify and verify these points.
The purpose of the HDCP is spot "the man in the middle" if it is an illeagle device, this is not the job of the Video stream .
Again I must ask...
What does this have to do with your installations (?), this is for equipment mfgr's to know/employ.
As an installer as long as the product works you are good, when it does not it is not because of encryption it is because there is a signal loss somewhere in the line.
That is what you as a "CI" need to worry about (because most mfgr's seem to not care).
What you keep bringing up (and possibly misunderstanding) has to do only with product design and DCP implementation.
There must be something here that I am too thick to notice (which my wife accuses me of a lot).
